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INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF A FATEFUL TRIP 
Six people embarked on a three-hour tour of Louisiana’s territorial 
waters in the M.V. Minnow, including a first mate named Gilligan, a 
millionaire couple, a movie star, a farm girl, and a science professor.1 The 
vessel’s steering system malfunctioned in a storm, causing the vessel to 
wreck onto a deserted island. After months on the island, the Coast Guard 
finally rescued the shipwrecked castaways. Upon being informed of their 
legal rights, the six castaways brought negligence claims against the 
manufacturer of the M.V. Minnow’s steering system.2 
At trial, the parties proved that the manufacturer knew of a defect that 
could cause the steering to fail suddenly and lead to catastrophic 
consequences. Despite this knowledge, the manufacturer neither fixed the 
steering system nor warned vessel operators of this potential hazard. After 
making these factual findings and applying general maritime products 
liability law, the jury concluded that the manufacturer acted willfully and 
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 1. Facts and characters of this introductory hypothetical are loosely based 
on Gilligan’s Island. See Gilligan’s Island (CBS television broadcast Sept. 1964). 
This Comment leaves out the Skipper because his ownership of the vessel could 
complicate the issue presented. As a vessel owner, the Skipper could be liable to 
Gilligan for breaching the duty of unseaworthiness. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 
Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960). Moreover, Skipper owes a duty of reasonable care 
under the circumstances to the other passengers. Kermerac v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959). 
 2. Facts and causes of action are loosely based on a Louisiana Third Circuit 
Court of Appeal case. See Warren v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 196 So. 3d 776 (La. 
Ct. App. 2016). 




wantonly in failing to warn vessel operators of the danger. Accordingly, 
the court awarded the castaways compensatory and punitive damages 
against the manufacturer. Not all of the castaways recovered the punitive 
damages awarded, however. 
Under the reasoning of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Scarborough v. Clemco Industries, Gilligan would not be able 
to recover punitive damages from the third-party manufacturer because he 
was a member of the crew of the M.V. Minnow.3 However, the non-
seafarers—the millionaire couple, the movie star, the farm girl, and the 
science professor—all may be able to recover maritime law punitive 
damages from the third-party tortfeasor. Gilligan’s employment connection 
to the M.V. Minnow precludes his recovery of punitive damages from the 
manufacturer despite the fact that he suffered from the same injuries caused 
by the same tortious misconduct. 
Absent a controlling congressional statute, maritime law should not 
treat seamen any differently in their remedies against a third-party non-
employer. This anomaly restricts the remedies of seamen and shields the 
third-party tortfeasor from accountability to all victims of its wrongful 
conduct. Relying on United States Supreme Court cases adjudicated 
subsequent to Scarborough,4 courts within the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals remain divided on whether seamen may recover punitive damages 
against third-party tortfeasors.5 In the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana, several judges have held, relying on 
Scarborough, that seamen cannot recover punitive damages from a third 
party.6 One judge within the same district has disagreed, however, relying 
on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Sounding Co., 
Inc. v. Townsend.7 After revisiting Scarborough in light of the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
 3. Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 391 F.3d 660, 66768 (5th Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 999 (2005). 
 4. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009); Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); see also Scarborough, 391 F.3d 660. 
 5. See Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C., No. 14-1900, 2015 WL 
5254710 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2015) (Fallon, J.); Hume v. Consol. Grain & Barge, 
Inc., No. 15-0935, 2016 WL 1089349 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2016) (Zainey, J.). But 
see Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, L.L.C., No. 13-4811, 2015 WL 7428581 (E.D. 
La. Nov. 20, 2015) (Morgan, J.); Wade v. Clemco Indus. Corp., No. 16-502, 2017 
WL 434425 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2017) (Fallon, J.). 
 6. See Howard, 2015 WL 7428581; see also Scarborough, 391 F.3d 660. 
 7. See Collins, 2015 WL 5254710, at *34; Hume, 2016 WL 1089349, at 
*2 (Fallon, J.) (arguing that the subsequent Supreme Court decision “effectively 
overruled” the Fifth Circuit precedent); see also Townsend, 557 U.S. 404. But see 
Wade, 2017 WL 434425 (demonstrating Judge Fallon changing course and 




reasoning in Townsend, the en banc Fifth Circuit should reverse 
Scarborough and permit both seamen and non-seamen to recover punitive 
damages under general maritime law. 
Part I of this Comment gives a brief overview of admiralty jurisdiction 
as well as the scope of maritime law. This Part also explains the sources 
of maritime law, its general principle of uniformity, and the remedies 
available to seamen. Part II analyzes the chronology of cases addressing 
maritime punitive damages. Additionally, Part II illustrates the split in the 
Eastern District of Louisiana concerning whether a Jones Act seaman may 
recover punitive damages from a third-party non-employer. Part III of this 
Comment argues that punitive damages remain available under general 
maritime law and that these damages are available to a Jones Act seaman 
against a third-party non-employer. To best achieve uniformity in 
maritime law, this Comment proposes that the law should afford seamen 
and non-seafarers the same protections under general maritime law against 
non-employers; to do otherwise would drown all hopes of protecting 
seamen as the “wards of admiralty.”8 
I. A THREE-HOUR TOUR THROUGH ADMIRALTY LAW 
Over the past several centuries, maritime law has developed into an 
expansive body of rules and principles covering a vast sea of parties and 
occurrences. Preliminarily, courts must determine whether the cause of 
action invokes admiralty jurisdiction. Once established, the court then 
must consider which of the various theories of liability the plaintiff may 
pursue. Finally, if the court finds the defendant liable, it must decide what 
types of damages the plaintiff may recover. 
A. The Scope of Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Pursuant to Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, 
“The judicial power shall extend . . . to all [c]ases of admiralty and 
                                                                                                             
finding that Jones Act seamen cannot recover punitive damages and Scarborough 
remains good law). 
 8. See Ramsay v. Allegre, 25 U.S. 611, 620 (1827) (Johnson, J., concurring) 
(referring to seamen for the first time as the “wards of . . . Admiralty”). Many later 
cases followed Ramsay’s use of this terminology. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 
U.S. 275, 286 (1897); Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co., 211 U.S. 239, 247 
(1908); see also Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 162 (1934) (“In respect of dealings 
of that order, the maritime law by inveterate tradition has made the ordinary seaman 
a member of a favored class. He is a ‘ward of the admiralty,’ often ignorant and 
helpless, and so in need of protection against himself as well as others.”). 




maritime [j]urisdiction.”9 Moreover, the Constitution also grants Congress 
the power “[t]o make all [l]aws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into [e]xecution the foregoing [p]owers and all other [p]owers 
vested by this Constitution in the [g]overnment of the United States or in 
any [d]epartment or [o]fficer thereof.”10 Although Congress possesses the 
“paramount power” to determine maritime law,11 if no controlling 
congressional statute applies, general maritime law as developed by 
federal courts governs admiralty.12 Relying on state and federal sources, 
general maritime law mixes traditional common law rules, modifies those 
rules, and creates new maritime principles.13 Therefore, general maritime 
law, also known as federal maritime law, as developed by the judiciary, 
coexists with and complements the statutory maritime law set and fixed 
by Congress. 
American maritime law draws its principles from three sources: 
federal statutes; federal common law; and, occasionally, state law.14 
Courts consistently emphasize that “the Constitution must have referred to 
a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole 
country”15 when it granted original jurisdiction to all cases of admiralty 
                                                                                                             
 9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Congress subsequently reinforced federal 
maritime jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012), which states, “The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of . . . 
[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases 
all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 11. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (“[I]t must now be 
accepted as settled doctrine that, in consequence of these provisions, Congress 
has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail 
throughout the country.”). 
 12. Id. (“[I]n the absence of some controlling statute, the general maritime 
law, as accepted by the [f]ederal courts, constitutes part of our national law, 
applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”). 
 13. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 
86465 (1986) (“[T]he general maritime law is an amalgam of traditional common-
law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules.”). 
 14. See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216. State law only applies in certain situations. 
As stated by the Supreme Court, “no such legislation is valid if it contravenes the 
essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to 
the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the 
proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate 
relations.” Id.; see also Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996). 
 15. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874). 




and maritime law to federal courts.16 This uniformity principle guides 
courts and Congress to develop a consistent body of rules throughout the 
entire United States17 for causes of action invoking admiralty 
jurisdiction.18 Uniformity provides practical consistency and predictability 
for actors engaged in maritime commerce throughout the United States. If 
the plaintiff’s case falls within the purview of maritime jurisdiction, he 
may pursue various causes of action.  
B. The Sea of Remedies Available to Jones Act Seamen 
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly known as the Jones 
Act, does not define “seaman” in its statutory language,19 but the Supreme 
Court has created a two-part test for such a determination.20 The seaman 
must “contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of 
its mission,”21 and the seaman must have a substantial connection both in 
                                                                                                             
 16. See Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Union Fish 
Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 (1919); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 
U.S. 375 (1970). 
 17. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. at 575. 
 18. Admiralty jurisdiction arises through congressional grants of jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 
U.S.C. §§ 30301–30308; Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101; 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950. 
Admiralty jurisdiction also arises under general maritime law. See Exec. Jet 
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). Jurisdiction over a tort 
requires “locality” and a determination of whether the tort possesses a substantial 
relationship to traditional maritime activity and the potential to disrupt maritime 
commerce. See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. 20, 34–35 (1865) (explaining admiralty 
jurisdiction and locality by stating that “[t]his class of cases may well be referred 
to as illustrating the true meaning of the rule of locality in cases of marine torts, 
namely, that the wrong and injury complained of must have been committed 
wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters.”); see also Sisson v. Ruby, 497 
U.S. 358, 362 (1990) (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674–
75 (1982)) (establishing the two-part test of admiralty jurisdiction). 
 19. See § 30104; see also Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 
441 (2001) (“A Jones Act claim is an in personam action for a seaman who suffers 
injury in the course of employment due to negligence of his employer, the vessel 
owner, or crew members.”).  
 20. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995). 
 21. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991) (“The key to 
seaman status is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation . . . [W]e 
believe the requirement that an employee’s duties must ‘contribute to the function of 
the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission’ captures well an important 
requirement of seaman status. It is not necessary that a seaman aid in navigation or 




time and nature to the vessel in navigation.22 Jones Act seamen may 
recover damages from their employer under multiple theories of liabilities: 
maintenance and cure; unseaworthiness; and negligence under the Jones 
Act, among others. General maritime law also provides a vast sea of 
remedies for Jones Act seamen to pursue against third parties.23 The 
identity of the defendant determines the causes of action a seaman may 
pursue.24 
1. The Seaman’s General Maritime Claim Against the Employer or 
the Vessel Owner 
Before the enactment of the Jones Act, seamen could recover damages 
against their employer based on two causes of action.25 Seamen could 
bring a claim for maintenance and cure against their employer or a claim 
for damages resulting from the unseaworthiness of the vessel against the 
vessel owner.26 Both claims would arise under general maritime law.27 
                                                                                                             
contribute to the transportation of the vessel, but a seaman must be doing the ship’s 
work.” (quoting Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959))).  
 22. Latsis, 515 U.S. at 368. See Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 
548, 557 (1997) (discussing that determination of an identifiable group of vessels 
turns on whether the vessels are under common ownership or control). 
 23. Latsis, 515 U.S. at 354. 
 24. See infra Part I.B. 
 25. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). The Court in this case stated, 
Upon a full review, however, of English and American authorities upon 
these questions, we think the law may be considered as settled upon the 
following propositions: 1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in 
case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the 
extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long as 
the voyage is continued. 2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by 
English and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received 
by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure 
to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship. 
3. That all the members of the crew, except, perhaps, the master, are, as 
between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover 
for injuries sustained through the negligence of another member of the 
crew beyond the expense of his maintenance and cure. 4. That the 
seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of the 
master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and 
cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence or accident. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 




a. Maintenance and Cure 
Dating back to the 13th century, courts have recognized that “the 
vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, 
in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to 
his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued.”28 The seaman’s 
claim for maintenance and cure exists independently of his claims for 
negligence or unseaworthiness.29 Once the seaman has been injured, the 
obligation to pay maintenance and cure benefits arises immediately and 
does not require a finding of negligence or fault.30 Maritime law has long 
recognized that the vessel owner or employer owes a duty of “maintenance 
and cure,” and courts liberally interpret this duty to protect seamen’s 
rights.31 Moreover, the Supreme Court affirmed an award of punitive 
damages against an employer for the willful and wanton refusal to pay 
maintenance and cure to an injured seaman in the recent case of 
Townsend.32 
b. Unseaworthiness of the Vessel 
Unseaworthiness is a theory of recovery based on a vessel owner’s non-
delegable duty to ensure that the vessel, its crew, and its appurtenances are 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001) 
(“A claim for maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner’s obligation to 
provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the 
ship.”); Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 3 (1975); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 
U.S. 527, 532 (1962). The remedy entitles a seaman to maintenance and cure until 
he reaches maximum cure or the point at which medical science can no longer 
improve the seaman’s condition. Vaughan, 369 U.S at 538. 
 29. See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938) (“The duty, 
which arises from the contract of employment, . . . does not rest upon negligence 
or culpability on the part of the owner or master.”). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 531–32; see also Harden v. Gordon, C.C., 11 
F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (involving a crew member’s claim for wages 
earned and sick expenses). In Harden, Justice Story remarked that “[e]very court 
should watch with jealousy an encroachment upon the rights of seamen, because 
they are unprotected and need counsel . . . . But courts of maritime law have been 
in the constant habit of extending towards them a peculiar, protecting favor and 
guardianship. They are emphatically the wards of the admiralty.” Harden, 11 F. 
Cas at 485. 
 32. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009). 




reasonably fit for their intended use.33 Furthermore, “the vessel and her 
owner are . . . liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in 
consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and 
keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship.”34 The cause 
of action does not require that the vessel owner have knowledge of the 
unseaworthy condition.35 The vessel need not be maintained in perfect 
condition; rather, it only must be reasonably fit for its intended purpose.36 
To date, the Supreme Court has not considered whether a general 
maritime law claim for unseaworthiness may result in an award of punitive 
damages.37 A divided Fifth Circuit sitting en banc, however, decided that 
such damages remain unavailable in the seaman’s claim against the Jones 
Act employer.38 Nonetheless, damages for unseaworthiness may be 
pursued against only the employer or the vessel owner to which the 
seaman was assigned, not from third parties.39 Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s en 
banc McBride v. Estis Well Services, L.L.C. decision does not apply to a 
seaman’s general maritime law tort claim against third parties, who are 
neither employers nor vessel owners. With the growth of maritime 
commerce, Congress, in 1920, expanded the remedies available to those 
exposed to the “perils of the sea.”40 
2. The Seaman’s Jones Act Negligence Claim 
The Jones Act expanded the remedies available to a seaman.41 The 
Jones Act effectively overruled a portion of the Supreme Court’s prior 
decision in The Osceola42 by granting seamen a cause of action for 
                                                                                                             
 33. See Colon v. Trinidad Corp., 188 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Vargas v. 
McNamara, 608 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1979). 
 34. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). 
 35. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960). 
 36. See id. at 550 (“The standard is not perfections, but reasonable fitness; not 
a ship that will weather every conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable peril 
of the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended service.”). 
 37. See Wade v. Clemco Indus. Corp., No. 16-502, 2017 WL 434425, at *4–
6 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2017) (discussing punitive damage cases addressed by the 
Supreme Court in recent years).  
 38. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015). 
 39. See Bridges v. Penrod Drilling, 740 F.2d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 40. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995). 
 41. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 417 (2009). 
 42. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). The Court in this case stated, 
Upon a full review, however, of English and American authorities upon 
these questions, we think the law may be considered as settled upon the 




negligence against their employer.43 The remedy requires the existence of 
an employer-employee relationship between the seaman and the Jones Act 
employer.44 The Jones Act did not eliminate other maritime causes of 
action or create a mutually exclusive right; it simply created a statutory 
right for the seaman to sue the employer for damages resulting from its 
negligence.45 Twelve years before passing the Jones Act, Congress created 
an identical negligence cause of action in the Federal Employers’ Liability 
Act (“FELA”) for railway workers against their employers.46 The Jones 
Act incorporated FELA by reference; therefore, cases interpreting FELA 
also apply to the Jones Act. 47 
                                                                                                             
following propositions: 1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in 
case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the 
extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long as 
the voyage is continued. 2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by 
English and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received 
by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure 
to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship. 
3. That all the members of the crew, except, perhaps, the master, are, as 
between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover 
for injuries sustained through the negligence of another member of the 
crew beyond the expense of his maintenance and cure. 4. That the 
seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of the 
master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and 
cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence or accident. 
Id. at 175 (emphasis added). 
 43. See 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012) (“A seaman injured in the course of 
employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal representative of 
the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, 
against the employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal 
injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section.”). 
 44. See Volyrakis v. M/V Isabella, 668 F.2d 863, 865–66 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 45. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 416. See McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 
U.S. 337, 342 (1991). 
 46. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (“Every common carrier by railroad while engaging 
in commerce . . . shall be liable in damage to any person suffering injury while he 
is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or in the case of the death of such 
employee, to his or her personal representative . . . for such injury or death 
resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or 
employees of such carrier, or by reasons of any defect or insufficiency, due to its 
negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, 
boats, wharves, or other equipment.”). 
 47. See § 30104 (“Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal 
injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section.”). 




Courts consistently hold that the Jones Act does not allow an award of 
punitive damages to the Jones Act seaman.48 The Jones Act, however, 
applies only to a claim by a Jones Act seaman against his employer and 
“Congress has not addressed the issue of non-employer liability.”49 A 
claim by an injured plaintiff, who happens to be a seaman, against a non-
employer does not implicate the Jones Act and should not trigger its 
limitation on damages.50 The claim against the non-employer arises not 
from a seaman’s status, but rather pursuant to general maritime law tort 
principles. 
3. Causes of Action Available to Seamen Against Third Parties 
In addition to the causes of action available to seamen against 
employers and vessel owners, general maritime law has long recognized 
various causes of action for maritime torts.51 As long as the tort meets the 
test for admiralty jurisdiction,52 the plaintiff may pursue a claim.53 Seamen 
have various remedies at their disposal if they become injured.54 Not only 
may they sue for claims arising from seaman status, but they also may sue 
any third party committing a tort cognizable by general maritime law or 
                                                                                                             
 48. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (discussing the 
history behind FELA and its pecuniary limitation); see also Bergen v. F/V St. 
Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987), opinion modified on reh’g, 866 F.2d 
318 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Punitive damages are non-pecuniary damages unavailable 
under the Jones Act.”); Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1457 
(6th Cir. 1993) (“It has been the unanimous judgment of the courts since before 
the enactment of the Jones Act that punitive damages are not recoverable under 
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Punitive damages are not therefore 
recoverable under the Jones Act.”). 
 49. Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 391 F.3d 660, 667 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. 
denied, 544 U.S. 999 (2005). 
 50. See Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C., No. 14-1900, 2015 WL 
5254710, at *4–5 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2015). 
 51. See Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (C.C.D. Me. 1833) (Story, J.) 
(“The admiralty has not, and never (I believe) deliberately claimed to have any 
jurisdiction over torts, except such as are maritime torts, that is, such as are 
committed on the high seas, or on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.”).  
 52. See supra note 18. 
 53. See, e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 
625, 630 (1959) (holding that a shipowner owes a duty of reasonable care towards 
persons lawfully aboard the vessel); E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 
Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986) (holding that general maritime law incorporated 
products liability law into its general principles). 
 54. See supra Part I.B. 




any applicable state law for a land-based injury.55 Nevertheless, a 
substantial debate has surfaced in maritime law regarding the remedies 
available in these various causes of action. 
C. The Weather Started Getting Rough: Punitive Damages in Maritime 
Law 
Punitive damages are defined as “damages assessed by way of 
penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example to others.”56 They operate 
as “private fines” intended to punish the defendant for reckless disregard 
for the safety of others or willful and wanton misconduct.57 United States 
common law established the doctrine of punitive damages in its early 
history,58 but admiralty law suffers from a long and complicated 
relationship with punitive damages both before the passage of the Jones 
Act and thereafter. 
1. Pre-Jones Act Punitive Damages 
Plaintiffs can recover punitive damages under common-law 
principles;59 admiralty courts, however, did not clearly articulate and 
decide whether punitive damages were available in maritime law.60 In 
early 19th century cases, the Supreme Court referenced a judge’s ability 
to award “vindictive” or “exemplary” damages.61 In an 1818 case 
involving the plundering of a vessel, The Amiable Nancy, Justice Story 
noted that if the plaintiffs had brought the suit against the original 
                                                                                                             
 55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of . . . [a]ny civil case of 
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to which they are otherwise entitled.”). 
 56. See Punitive Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 57. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool, 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001). 
 58. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851). 
 59. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 409–10 (2009). 
 60. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law, 
28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 73 passim (1997) (discussing historical maritime cases 
awarding punitive damages). 
 61. See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546 passim (1818) (discussing 
exemplary and vindictive damages against the original wrongdoers for the 
robbery and plundering of a vessel); see also La Amistad De Rues, 18 U.S. 385 
passim (1820) (referring to exemplary damages in a prize case); The Apollon, 22 
U.S. 362, 374 (1824) (considering the possibility of vindictive damages in a vessel 
seizure case); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1827) (reviewing the possibility of 
vindictive damages in a prize case). 




wrongdoers and not the shipowner, “proper punishment” consisting of 
exemplary damages would be warranted for such reprehensible 
misconduct.62 Likewise, lower federal courts discussed the possibility of 
exemplary and vindictive damages in the maritime tort context.63 
Furthermore, in the 1893 case of Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. 
Prentice,64 while discussing the availability of punitive or vindictive 
damages, the Supreme Court found that admiralty cases rely on the same 
common-law principles for awarding punitive damages.65 Although most 
early cases discussing exemplary or vindictive damages did not actually 
award damages against the defendant, “that fact does not draw into 
question the basic understanding that punitive damages were considered 
an available maritime remedy.”66 Notwithstanding this early history, 
starting in the 20th century, Congress began to legislate comprehensively 
in the area of maritime law; consequently, seamen no longer needed to rely 
on common law and the federal courts to grant relief.67 Because statutory 
maritime law preempts general maritime law,68 many admiralty courts 
now look first to statutory maritime law, such as the Jones Act, as guidance 
for determining damage awards for seamen, including punitive damages.69 
                                                                                                             
 62. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. at 558. 
 63. See McGuire v. The Golden Gate, 16 F. Cas. 141, 143 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1856) 
(“In an action against the perpetrator of the wrong, the aggrieved party would be 
entitled to recover not only actual damages but exemplary, such as would vindicate 
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Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 F. Cas. 957, 957 (C.C. Mass. 1820) (“In cases of marine 
torts, or illegal captures, it is far from being uncommon in the admiralty to allow costs 
and expences [sic], and to mulct the offending parties, even in exemplary damages, 
where the nature of the case requires it.”). 
 64. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893). 
 65. Id. at 108 (“[C]ourts of admiralty . . . proceed, in cases of tort, upon the same 
principles as courts of common law, in allowing exemplary damages . . . for expenses 
incurred, or injuries or losses sustained, by the misconduct of the other party.”). 
 66. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 412 n.2 (2009). 
 67. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990). 
 68. See supra note 11. 
 69. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31–32. 




2. Post-Jones Act Punitive Damages 
After the passage of the Jones Act and other statutory maritime law,70 
the inquiry before the courts began to shift as to whether such laws 
displaced general maritime law recovery available to seamen. Because 
Congress passed piecemeal rather than comprehensive statutes,71 courts 
and judges were left to navigate through the unchartered waters of 
recovery and liability. 
a. Taking Wind out of the Sails: From Loss of Society Damages to 
Punitive Damages 
Several key cases from the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court initiated 
a trend of restricting a seaman’s recovery of certain damages, including 
loss of society72 and other non-pecuniary damages.73 Courts then classified 
punitive damages as non-pecuniary damages and disallowed the recovery 
of such awards.74 These cases, whose subject matter ranged from wrongful 
death to unseaworthiness to Jones Act negligence, explored the interplay 
between general maritime law recovery and the preclusive effect of 
statutory maritime law.75 This trend led some scholars to predict that 
seamen might no longer be able to recover punitive damages, but the 
Supreme Court rocked the boat in 2008 and 2009.76 
                                                                                                             
 70. See, e.g., Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012); Death on the High Seas 
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30302; Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101; Longshore 
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903. 
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recover under the Act). But see Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30302 
(identifying only pecuniary damages as recoverable under the Act). 
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consortium. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: 
Miles, Baker, and Townsend, 70 LA. L. REV. 463, 464–65 (2010), for a discussion 
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 73. See infra Part I.C.2.a. 
 74. See infra Part I.C.2.a.ii. 
 75. See infra Part I.C.  
 76. See infra Part I.C.2.c–d; see also David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in 
American Maritime Law, supra note 60, at 163 (“Punitive damages are thus rapidly 
disappearing from maritime personal injury law.”). But see Robertson, Punitive 
Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: Miles, Baker, and Townsend, supra note 72, at 463 
(“In 1997 I wrote that ‘[p]unitive damages are . . . rapidly disappearing from maritime 
personal injury law.’ It turns out this was a premature obituary.”).  




i. The Rising Tides of Denied Recovery: From DOHSA and 
Higginbotham to the Jones Act and Miles 
Several key wrongful death cases decided both before and after the 
passage of the Jones Act began to slowly limit the recoveries available to 
seamen, culminating with Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham.77 In 1978, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the limited issue of whether the 
widows of passengers killed in a helicopter crash outside Louisiana’s 
territorial waters could recover loss of society damages.78 In 
Higginbotham, the Court needed to decide “which measure of damages to 
apply in a death action arising on the high seas—the rule chosen by 
Congress in 1920 [in the Death on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”)79] or 
the rule chosen by this Court in Gaudet.”80 Ignoring policy arguments, the 
Higginbotham Court noted that “Congress has struck the balance for us. It 
has limited survivors to recovery of their pecuniary losses.”81 
The Court recognized the need for uniformity in maritime law but 
explained that a desire for uniformity of recovery cannot prevail over the 
statute.82 Even if the damages available in a wrongful death action in 
territorial waters would differ from the same action on the high seas, 
DOHSA controls and should be the primary guide in the Court’s 
decision.83 Although general maritime law may supplement statutory 
maritime law, “[t]here is a basic difference between filling a gap left by 
Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and 
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 78. Id. at 620. 
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 80. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 623. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 
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damages under general maritime law for the wrongful death of the decedent 
occurring in state territorial waters). 
 81. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 623. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 624. 




specifically enacted.”84 Therefore, the Court limited the measure of 
damages in a wrongful death action occurring on the high seas to those 
pecuniary losses allowed by DOHSA.85 After Higginbotham, the Supreme 
Court decided another wrongful death case, which left the waters of 
seaman recovery even murkier.  
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.86 To 
establish a uniform rule applicable to all wrongful death causes of action, 
the Court held that the seaman’s survivors could not recover loss of society 
damages in either a negligence action against the employer or an 
unseaworthiness action against a vessel owner.87 The plaintiff brought suit 
against Apex Marine Corporation and several other defendants as owners 
of the vessel.88 The plaintiff alleged that the decedent’s Jones Act 
employer negligently failed to prevent the death of her son.89 In addition, 
the plaintiff contended that the defendant breached the general maritime 
law warranty of seaworthiness of the vessel.90 The plaintiff sought several 
categories of damages, including loss of society.91 
The Court considered whether the Jones Act had the same preclusive 
effect on recovery as DOHSA.92 The Court first turned to Higginbotham for 
guidance.93 Traditionally, if Congress leaves an area of the law open, 
admiralty courts supplement applicable maritime statutes.94 Higginbotham, 
however, reasoned that “in an ‘area covered by the statute, it would be no 
more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of damages than to 
prescribe a different statute of limitations, or a different class of 
beneficiaries.’”95 The Court found that the principle of Higginbotham 
controlled the case before it96 and then turned to the preemptory effect of 
the Jones Act on the recoverability of loss of society damages in a 
wrongful death action against the Jones Act employer.97 
                                                                                                             
 84. Id. at 625. 
 85. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 21 (1990). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 32–33. 
 88. Id. at 21. 
 89. Id. A member of the crew of the M/V Archon stabbed the decedent 
multiple times. Id. 
 90. Id. Plaintiff contended the vessel was unseaworthy because the defendant 
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 91. Id. at 21–22. 
 92. Id. at 31. 
 93. Id. at 31–33; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978). 
 94. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 at 625.  
 95. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31 (quoting Higginbotham, 439 U.S. at 625). 
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The Supreme Court examined the history and purpose of the Jones 
Act.98 In 1920, Congress enacted the Jones Act to overrule The Osceola99 
and create a statutory negligence cause of action for the death or injury of 
a seaman against his employer.100 Notably, “[t]he Jones Act evinces no 
general hostility to recovery under [general] maritime law.”101 The statute 
merely aimed to establish a uniform system of seaman tort law identical 
to the tort remedies available to railway employees under FELA.102 
Because the Jones Act incorporated FELA by reference, the Miles Court 
examined FELA to determine if loss of society damages were available in a 
FELA wrongful death cause of action.103 By its clear statutory language, 
FELA declares that employers “shall be liable in damages.”104 Earlier cases 
interpreting FELA wrongful death actions, however, had held that 
recoverable damages were limited to pecuniary losses against the 
employer.105 Relying on this limitation, the Miles Court concluded that 
when Congress passed the Jones Act, incorporating FELA unaltered and its 
progeny, Congress intended to impose a pecuniary limitation in the Jones 
Act wrongful death action as well.106 Therefore, because FELA precluded 
a wrongful death award of damages for loss of society, its identical 
                                                                                                             
 98. Id. at 29. 
 99. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). 
 100. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001). 
 101. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32 (quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 at 625). 
 102. Id. at 29 (“Rather, the Jones Act establishes a uniform system of seamen’s tort 
law parallel to that available to employees of interstate railway carriers under FELA.”). 
 103. Id.  
 104. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012) (“Every common carrier by railroad while 
engaging in commerce . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering 
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or in the case of 
the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative . . . for such 
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 105. See Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70–71 (1913) (holding 
that in a wrongful death action FELA limited the plaintiff’s recovery to pecuniary 
damages, which did not include “damages by way of recompense for grief or 
wounded feelings” nor the loss of society of the companion); see also David W. 
Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: Miles, Baker, and Townsend, 
supra note 72, at 464–65 (“Pecuniary compensatory damages are those that are 
measurable in money, at least notionally. In personal injury cases, the standard 
pecuniary categories of compensatory damages are lost earnings and earning 
capacity and medical and related expenses.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 106. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32. 




counterpart—the Jones Act—also precluded the recovery of non-pecuniary 
damages.107 
The Miles Court then extended this limitation of damages. The 
plaintiff’s claim rested not only on the Jones Act but also on a general 
maritime law claim for unseaworthiness.108 The Court, however, concluded 
that the close relationship between the Jones Act and unseaworthiness 
prohibited recovery of non-pecuniary damages in this separate cause of 
action as well. Because Congress did not allow recovery of loss of society 
damages in a cause of action that requires a showing of fault under the Jones 
Act, it would be inappropriate for the Supreme Court to allow a more 
expansive remedy in the judicially created unseaworthiness action, which 
requires no showing of fault.109 Because statutory maritime law precluded 
the recovery of loss of society in a wrongful death action, general maritime 
law also precluded these damages to achieve a uniform rule in maritime law 
for wrongful death causes of action.110 
Although the Miles decision did not contemplate the issue of punitive 
damages, many subsequent courts expanded the Miles uniformity 
principle to preclude awarding punitive damages to seamen.111 Many 
courts interpreted non-pecuniary damages to include punitive damages 
and therefore disallowed their recovery under the Jones Act.112 
                                                                                                             
 107. Id. (“When Congress passed the Jones Act, the Vreeland gloss on FELA, 
and the hoary tradition behind it, were well established. Incorporating FELA 
unaltered into the Jones Act, Congress must have intended to incorporate the 
pecuniary limitation on damages as well. We assume that Congress is aware of 
existing law when it passes legislation.”). Therefore, because FELA did not allow 
recovery of loss of society damages, its counterpart, the Jones Act, also did not allow 
such damages. Id.; see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696–97 (1979) 
(“It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other 
citizens, know the law.”). 
 108. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 32–33. 
 111. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015) (denying the recovery of punitive damages 
in an unseaworthiness cause of action); Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 
1347 (9th Cir. 1987), opinion modified on reh’g, 866 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(“Punitive damages are non-pecuniary damages unavailable under the Jones 
Act.”); Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1457 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(“Punitive damages are not therefore recoverable under the Jones Act.”). 
 112. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law, 
supra note 60, at 143–55 (discussing cases denying punitive damages based on Miles). 
See also Phillip M. Smith, Comment, A Watery Grave for Unseaworthiness Punitive 




ii. Sailing Miles Too Far 
In 1995, the Fifth Circuit expanded the Miles pecuniary damage 
limitation to deny a seaman the right to recover punitive damages in a 
maintenance and cure cause of action.113 In Guevara v. Maritime Overseas 
Corporation, the seaman-plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging 
negligence under the Jones Act and an unseaworthiness claim under 
general maritime law.114 In addition, Guevara requested punitive damages 
for his employer’s failure to pay maintenance and cure.115 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the trial court’s 
award of punitive damages and extended the reasoning of Miles in finding 
that general maritime law does not permit an award of punitive damages 
for the willful refusal to pay maintenance and cure.116 In so doing, the Fifth 
Circuit overruled Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.117 and In re Merry 
Shipping.118 In Merry Shipping, the Fifth Circuit held that even if punitive 
damages were not available under the Jones Act, it did not follow that 
punitive damages also would be unavailable under general maritime law 
for an unseaworthiness claim.119 Revisiting the same issue 14 years later, 
the Fifth Circuit in Guevara reasoned that in light of the Miles decision, 
the analysis of Merry Shipping was no longer sound.120 
Adopting the analytical framework of Miles, the Fifth Circuit 
articulated a test for whether Miles applies to a case to limit damages. The 
court must first analyze the factual setting of the case at hand.121 If a federal 
statute applies and directs or limits the recovery available in the situation, 
then, the statute controls.122 Furthermore, the applicable statute also 
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precludes or limits the recovery available under general maritime law.123 
The Fifth Circuit found that “[a]lthough the Miles Court did not mention 
punitive damages, they are also rightfully classified as non-pecuniary.”124 
Therefore, even though the Miles Court did not address punitive damages, 
the Fifth Circuit in Guevara expanded Miles to preclude the recovery of 
those damages. 
Applying this test, the Fifth Circuit concluded that maintenance and 
cure actually involves two types of actions.125 The “tort-like” maintenance 
and cure action requires personal injury and the “contract-like” action 
may, but need not, involve personal injury.126 Because the tort-like 
maintenance and cure action includes personal injury, it “overlaps with the 
personal injury coverage of the Jones Act”127 and therefore invokes the 
Miles uniformity of damages principle. 
Guevara, however, brought a “contract-like” maintenance and cure 
cause of action.128 Even though no statutory overlap existed because the 
claim did not involve personal injury, “[the Fifth Circuit] believe[d] that 
punitive damages should not be available in any action for maintenance 
and cure, even in those contract-like actions that can only be brought under 
the general maritime law.”129 The Fifth Circuit’s concern with uniformity 
precluded an award of punitive damages in both types of maintenance and 
cure actions; therefore, a seaman no longer possessed a claim for punitive 
damages for willful nonpayment of maintenance and cure under general 
maritime law.130 In a subsequent case, the Fifth Circuit expanded this 
reasoning to preclude an award of non-pecuniary damages in another, 
completely separate cause of action that neither requires nor contemplates 
an employment relationship. 
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[A] court must first evaluate the factual setting of the case and determine 
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b. Uncharted Waters: Applying Miles to a Separate and Distinct 
Cause of Action 
In 2005, the Fifth Circuit, armed with the Miles uniformity principle 
and Guevara, concluded that neither a Jones Act seaman nor his survivors 
could recover non-pecuniary losses against a third-party non-employer.131 
From 1958 until 1967, William Scarborough worked aboard sandblasting 
vessels for two companies.132 Ten years after ending his employment as a 
sandblaster, Scarborough discovered that his exposure to siliceous 
particles during his employment caused him to contract silicosis.133 
Scarborough passed away from his illness in March 2002.134 
Following his death, Scarborough’s wife and adult children instituted 
a wrongful death suit against several defendants, seeking pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary damages.135 The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana concluded that under the Miles uniformity 
principle, a Jones Act seaman’s survivors could not recover non-pecuniary 
damages from a third party non-employer.136 The plaintiffs subsequently 
appealed to the Fifth Circuit.137 
The Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the Miles uniformity principle 
precluded the recovery of non-pecuniary damages.138 The court reiterated 
that Miles disallowed the recovery of loss of society damages in a general 
maritime wrongful death action to “‘restor[e] a uniform rule applicable to 
all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman.’”139 The plaintiffs 
attempted to distinguish Miles by arguing that the defendants were third-
party non-employers, thereby not invoking the Jones Act.140 The Fifth 
Circuit turned to its earlier decision, Guevara, for guidance on this issue. 
The Fifth Circuit reiterated the Guevara test of when the Miles 
uniformity principle limits the recovery of damages.141 If the factual 
situation implicates a statutory remedial measure and that statute limits 
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recovery, then the recovery under general maritime law also will be 
limited.142 The Guevara principles could not be met in this factual setting 
because the plaintiffs brought suit against a third-party non-employer and 
not the Jones Act employer.143 Even if the Guevara principles for 
application of Miles did not apply, however, Guevara still controlled the 
issue before the court.144 In Guevara, the court found that even though a 
congressional statute did not directly apply, the statute should apply to 
“highly analogous factual scenarios.”145 Additionally, courts should not 
allow a greater remedy in a judicially created cause of action than 
Congress allowed in the related remedial scheme. Therefore, the concern 
for uniformity in federal maritime law discouraged allowing recovery of a 
type of damages in one class of actions but not in another.146 
A panel of the Fifth Circuit, applying the Guevara reasoning, 
determined that the Scarborough plaintiffs’ action against a non-employer 
maritime tortfeasor was analogous to a Jones Act negligence claim against 
the employer.147 Just as Congress disallowed the recovery of non-
pecuniary damages in a Jones Act suit, the court determined that it would 
be inappropriate to award identical damages to the surviving spouse and 
heirs in an analogous suit against the third-party tortfeasor—the 
manufacturers of siliceous materials.148 The Fifth Circuit would not ignore 
the “bright line directive of Miles” that limits recovery to pecuniary 
damages.149 Miles “is concerned with uniformity in the damages 
recoverable by a Jones Act seaman and his survivors, not with uniformity 
of the types of damages to which various defendants are subjected.”150 
Relying on its Guevara analysis of Miles, the court ultimately found that 
neither a Jones Act seaman nor his survivors may recover non-pecuniary 
damages from third-party non-employers.151 But the Supreme Court since 
has eroded plaintiff recovery limitations under general maritime law.  
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c. Punitive Damages Under General Maritime Law 
On March 24, 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez, supervised by 
Captain Joseph Hazelwood, ran aground on a reef along the Alaskan 
coast.152 The collision ruptured the ship’s hull, and it spilled millions of 
gallons of oil into the Prince William Sound.153 After Exxon settled claims 
for environmental damage, commercial fishermen and native Alaskans 
brought suit for economic losses to their livelihoods, which were 
dependent on the Sound.154 
At the district court level, a class of plaintiffs sought punitive damages 
from Exxon.155 The jury heard evidence of Exxon’s management’s acts 
and omissions relevant to the spill, including Exxon’s knowledge of 
Captain Hazelwood’s alcohol addiction and subsequent relapse.156 The 
court instructed the jury on the purpose of punitive damages and asked the 
jury to consider “the reprehensibility of the defendants’ conduct, their 
financial condition, the magnitude of the harm, and any mitigating facts” 
in awarding any punitive damages.157 The jury awarded $5,000 in punitive 
damages against Hazelwood and $5 billion against Exxon.158 On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals lowered the award against Exxon to 
$2.5 billion.159 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether 
the punitive damages award was (1) permissible; and, if so, (2) excessive 
under maritime common law.160 
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Considering whether the award was permissible, the Supreme Court 
began its analysis with a historical overview of punitive damages.161 
Courts throughout the United States frequently award exemplary or 
punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages, and “the 
consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but 
principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”162 After 
determining that the only applicable federal statute did not preclude an 
award of punitive damages, the Court affirmed the award of punitive 
damages under general maritime law but reduced the amount as 
excessive.163 One year later, the Court addressed whether a Jones Act 
seaman could recover punitive damages against his employer.164 
d. Seamen Can Recover Punitive Damages from Their Employer 
In 2009, the Supreme Court decided a landmark case involving punitive 
damages in a seaman’s claim against his Jones Act employer. In Atlantic 
Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, the Court held that a Jones Act seaman 
could recover punitive damages against his employer for a willful and 
wanton disregard of its general maritime obligation to pay maintenance and 
cure benefits to a seaman.165 The plaintiff, Edgar L. Townsend, worked as a 
crewmember of a tugboat.166 While aboard the vessel, the plaintiff fell on 
the steel deck and injured his arm and shoulder.167 After the accident, the 
plaintiff claimed that his employer, Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., advised him 
that it would not provide maintenance and cure.168 Townsend filed suit 
against his employer, alleging negligence under general maritime law and 
the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, “arbitrary and willful failure to pay 
maintenance and cure,” and wrongful termination.169 The plaintiff also 
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sought punitive damages for the employer’s denial of maintenance and 
cure.170 
The Court relied on three arguments to allow the recovery of punitive 
damages.171 First, punitive damages “have long been an available remedy 
at common law for wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct.”172 The Court 
cited multiple cases dating back from 17th-century England to 19th-
century America indicating the jury’s ability to award any damages it sees 
fit, including punitive damages.173 Furthermore, the Court pointed out 
several cases in which it acknowledged the common-law doctrine of 
punitive damages.174 Second, the Court extended this common-law doctrine 
to claims arising under general maritime law.175 Third, the Court examined 
the historical recognition of a seaman’s right to maintenance and cure and 
determined that statutory federal admiralty law did not preclude the 
application of this doctrine of punitive damages to a claim in the 
maintenance and cure context.176 
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Significantly, the Court explained that nothing in the Jones Act 
indicated any deviance from this common-law doctrine.177 Looking at the 
text of the Jones Act, the Court concluded that it “created a statutory cause 
of action for negligence, but it did not eliminate pre-existing remedies 
available to seamen for the separate common-law cause of action based on 
a seaman’s right to maintenance and cure.”178 The Jones Act gives a seaman 
the ability to elect to bring a claim against his employer for negligence; thus, 
neither the language of the Jones Act nor its jurisprudential progeny bar the 
recovery of punitive damages in a maintenance and cure claim.179 
The Court then turned to the so-called Miles principle of uniformity.180 
The Court distinguished that Miles arose from a general maritime law 
wrongful death cause of action based on the unseaworthiness of the 
vessel.181 Although the “reasoning of Miles remain[ed] sound,”182 the 
Court found that it did not apply to the case at hand because neither the 
Death on the High Seas Act183 nor the Jones Act addressed a seaman’s 
right to maintenance and cure.184 Because “no statute [cast] doubt on their 
availability under general maritime law,”185 the seaman-plaintiff would be 
entitled to recover punitive damages under general maritime law for the 
employer’s arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure.186 
Although the Miles decision predicated its reasoning on the maritime 
principle of uniformity, the Court undermined that notion by stating, “[t]he 
laudable quest for uniformity in admiralty does not require the narrowing 
of available damages to the lowest common denominator approved by 
Congress for distinct causes of action.”187 The Court’s decision expressly 
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abrogated the Fifth Circuit decision in Guevara,188 which the Scarborough 
court notably relied heavily upon to expand the Miles uniformity principle 
to third-party tortfeasors in a distinct cause of action.189 
Townsend potentially parted the seas for a Jones Act seaman to recover 
punitive damages under general maritime law. The Court limited its 
decision to the narrow issue of punitive damages in the maintenance and 
cure context, leaving unanswered whether seamen can recover punitive 
damages in other contexts.190 The Supreme Court, however, provided a key 
analytical framework for determining the recovery of punitive damages 
based on three inquiries.191 First, does the cause of action invoke any directly 
applicable federal statute? Second, did the cause of action preexist the 
federal statute? Finally, does the applicable federal statute displace an award 
of punitive damages?192 
After Townsend, in McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., the en banc 
Fifth Circuit held that even though the seaman-plaintiff’s general maritime 
law unseaworthiness claim did not invoke statutory maritime law, the 
plaintiff could not recover punitive damages from his employer.193 Relying 
on Miles, the court concluded that the Jones Act limited a seaman’s 
recovery to pecuniary losses when liability arose from the Jones Act or 
unseaworthiness.194 Moreover, the court found that punitive damages 
should be classified as non-pecuniary and therefore unrecoverable.195 The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.196 
In the context of a cause of action against a third-party non-employer, 
however, neither unseaworthiness nor the Jones Act apply. The general 
maritime tort cause of action against a third party is wholly and distinctly 
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separate from the Jones Act and unseaworthiness.197 A claim against a 
third-party non-employer necessarily requires a different analytical 
approach than courts adopt in a cause of action against the Jones Act 
employer. Neither McBride nor Townsend involved third-party tortfeasor 
liability, leaving a whirlpool of unanswered questions for lower courts to 
navigate. 
II. A SHIPWRECK IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
Recently, several judges in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana addressed whether a seaman may recover 
punitive damages against a non-employer third party based on a general 
maritime law tort claim.198 Two judges, interpreting United States 
Supreme Court precedent, held that punitive damages remain available to 
seamen in their general maritime law claims against third parties.199 Other 
judges, adhering to Scarborough,200 refused to allow recovery of these 
damages.201 The same judge that first held that seamen could recover 
punitive damages changed course, however, and held the exact opposite 
two years later.202 As of now, a maritime plaintiff’s ultimate recovery in 
the Eastern District could be determined simply based on which judge the 
court assigns to the case. The uncertainty caused by this split should 
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motivate the Fifth Circuit, en banc, to clarify its prior precedent or overrule 
Scarborough. 
A. Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C. 
On August 13, 2014, a vessel towing a crane barge allided203 with the 
Florida Avenue lift bridge in the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal in 
Orleans Parish.204 The mast of the crane barge hit the bridge and caused 
the crane boom to crash onto the pilot house, killing Michael Collins, a 
barge worker.205 
Collins’s widow brought suit against her husband’s Jones Act 
employer/vessel owner, alleging negligence and unseaworthiness.206 The 
widow also brought suit for negligence under general maritime law against 
the owner of the crane barge and the Port of New Orleans (“Port”) as 
owner and operator of the lift bridge.207 The plaintiff sought punitive 
damages from the Port, alleging gross negligence.208 The Port argued that 
the Jones Act and general maritime law precluded an award of punitive 
damages.209 
Judge Fallon noted that the decedent was a Jones Act seaman killed in 
Louisiana territorial waters by the alleged gross negligence of a third-party 
tortfeasor who did not employ the seaman.210 Therefore, the claim arose 
under general maritime law.211 The Port argued that the plaintiff could not 
recover punitive damages from it based on Miles, McBride, and 
Scarborough.212 The plaintiff contended that none of the three cases were 
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dispositive.213 Therefore, the court needed to decide whether a seaman’s 
limited right to recover only pecuniary damages against his employer, 
established in Miles and affirmed in McBride, extended to a non-employer 
third-party tortfeasor.214 
After discussing the reasoning of Townsend,215 Judge Fallon 
concluded that the Jones Act had no bearing on the plaintiff’s claim against 
a non-employer defendant.216 McBride and Miles precluded recovery of 
non-pecuniary damages only from the seaman’s employer, not as against 
a third-party tortfeasor under general maritime law.217 Judge Fallon 
concluded that in a general maritime law claim against a third party non-
employer, it made no difference whether the plaintiff was a “seaman, a 
longshoreman or a passenger,” and “there [was] no need for uniform 
treatment of an employer and a third party tortfeasor where there is no 
statutory remedy that is different than the general maritime law remedy.”218 
The plaintiff’s status as a seaman was irrelevant in a suit against a 
third-party tortfeasor; the only relevant inquiry was whether the seaman’s 
personal representative could assert a claim for punitive damages based on 
gross negligence under general maritime law.219 Citing Townsend and 
Baker,220 Judge Fallon concluded that general maritime law did allow the 
plaintiff to recover punitive damages from a non-employer third party.221 
Judge Fallon then discussed this issue in light of Scarborough.222 In 
Scarborough, the Fifth Circuit held “that neither one who has invoked his 
Jones Act seaman status nor his survivors may recover nonpecuniary 
damages from non-employer third parties.”223 Judge Fallon noted that 
Scarborough relied on Guevara224 to expand Miles to eliminate the 
seaman’s potential punitive damage recovery from third parties.225 
Although Scarborough theoretically binds district courts within the Fifth 
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Circuit, Judge Fallon concluded that Scarborough “has been effectively 
overruled” by Townsend.226 He determined that because Townsend 
abrogated Guevara, upon which the Scarborough holding was based, 
“Scarborough is inconsistent with current Supreme Court precedent.”227 
Therefore, Scarborough did not bind the district court. Judge Fallon 
concluded that, based on Townsend, if the Jones Act does not apply, a 
seaman should recover punitive damages under general maritime law and 
be treated no differently than a non-seaman.228 Because the plaintiff 
asserted a claim under general maritime law and not the Jones Act, she 
could pursue general maritime law punitive damages from the third-party 
non-employer tortfeasor.229 
B. Hume v. Consolidated Grain & Barge, Inc. 
Corey Hume and Clarence Robinson both worked as seamen aboard 
the M/V Bayou Special for the defendant, Consolidated Grain & Barge, 
Inc. (“CGB”).230 While at work, both plaintiffs suffered injuries and 
shortly thereafter instituted litigation against their employer, CGB, 
seeking damages for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and 
maintenance and cure.231 They also brought suit against Quality Marine,232 
alleging negligence and unseaworthiness.233 Additionally, they sought 
punitive damages from both defendants under general maritime law.234 
To support its motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim,235 
Quality Marine relied on the United States Fifth Circuit precedent of 
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McBride236 and Scarborough.237 In McBride, the Fifth Circuit cited 
Miles,238 which limited a Jones Act seaman’s recovery to pecuniary losses 
if liability arose from the Jones Act or unseaworthiness.239 The Fifth 
Circuit concluded that because punitive damages are considered non-
pecuniary240 losses, the injured seaman in McBride could not recover 
punitive damages against his employer.241 
Quality Marine also cited Scarborough,242 an earlier decision in the 
Fifth Circuit.243 Scarborough also relied on Miles to conclude that neither 
a seaman who has invoked the Jones Act nor his survivors may recover 
punitive damages from a non-employer third party.244 To allow recovery 
of non-pecuniary damages would be inconsistent with the Jones Act in 
which Congress precluded the recovery of such damages in a Jones Act 
suit.245 
The plaintiffs countered Quality Marine’s cited caselaw by relying on 
Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C.246 Judge Zainey agreed with 
Judge Fallon’s decision in Collins.247 Similar to Collins, the Hume 
plaintiffs’ claim against a third-party non-employer, Quality Marine, did 
not implicate the Jones Act.248 
Judge Zainey agreed that Scarborough has been “effectively 
overruled” by the Supreme Court’s decision in Townsend.249 As “the Jones 
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Act has no bearing on Plaintiffs’ claims against Quality Marine,” the 
seamen could recover punitive damages under general maritime law 
against the non-employer tortfeasor.250 
C. Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, L.L.C. 
Contrary to Judge Fallon and Judge Zainey’s reasoning, Judge 
Morgan took a different approach and denied the possibility of recovering 
punitive damages from a third party non-employer.251 Raymond and 
Calvin Howard were injured during a personnel-basket transfer from the 
M/V Contender to the deck of the L/B Janie.252 Offshore Liftboats, LLC 
(“OLB”) employed both plaintiffs and owned the L/B Janie.253 K & K 
Offshore, LLC (“KKO”) owned and operated the M/V Contender.254 The 
plaintiffs filed suit against OLB as their Jones Act employer, claiming 
negligence and seeking punitive damages as relief.255 The two plaintiffs 
also sued KKO under general maritime law as a non-employer third party 
for negligence and unseaworthiness and sought to recover punitive 
damages.256 
In its defense, KKO argued that McBride257 controlled the case at 
hand. The plaintiffs cited Collins as support for the recoverability of 
punitive damages from the non-employer third party defendant.258 Judge 
Morgan rejected the plaintiffs’ argument and disagreed with Judge 
Fallon’s reasoning in Collins.259 
Judge Morgan noted that the Townsend decision specifically applied 
to the Jones Act plaintiff’s maintenance and cure claim against the Jones 
Act employer.260 The Supreme Court in Townsend carefully differentiated 
the historical maintenance and cure cause of action from a seaman’s 
remedies for negligence and unseaworthiness.261 Judge Morgan concluded 
that “although Townsend may give hope to seamen wishing to obtain 
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punitive damages for unseaworthiness claims against their employers and 
non-employers, ‘this [c]ourt cannot assume the Fifth Circuit has changed 
its position on personal injury claims falling outside the scope of 
Townsend.’”262 Furthermore, Judge Morgan noted that Scarborough has 
never been overruled and thus remains binding on the Eastern District.263 
Accordingly, Judge Morgan granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.264 
D. Wade v. Clemco Industries Corp. 
Two years after the Collins decision, Judge Fallon changed course and 
denied awarding punitive damages against a third-party non-employer in 
Wade v. Clemco Industries Corp.265 Garland R. Wade, the decedent, 
worked as a sandblaster and paint sprayer on vessels owned by Coating 
Specialists Inc. He also performed work in Louisiana and federal waters 
on permanent fixed platforms owned and/or operated by Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. (“Chevron”).266 Plaintiff, Wade’s widow, brought suit against Clemco 
Industries Corp. (“Clemco”), Mississippi Valley Silica Company (“MV”), 
Lamorak Insurance Co. (“Lamorak”), and Chevron, alleging that defective 
design, manufacture, and distribution of the materials used by the decedent 
in his work exposed him to silica and led to his cancer, which eventually 
caused his premature death.267 Wade’s widow also claimed failure to warn 
and failure to provide sufficient equipment and protective gear by Clemco, 
MV, and Chevron.268 She requested more than $5 million in damages, 
including punitive damages for non-pecuniary losses.269 Lamorak, MV, 
Clemco, and Chevron all filed motions for partial summary judgment to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages.270 
The defendants argued that, based on Scarborough, Wade’s widow 
could not recover her non-pecuniary damages. Specifically, they argued 
that Townsend did not overrule Scarborough as to the availability of non-
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pecuniary damages against a non-employer third party.271 Instead, it 
simply allowed a seaman to recover punitive damages for the willful and 
arbitrary withholding of maintenance and cure payments.272 Plaintiff 
countered that the Eastern District’s decision in Collins, not Scarborough, 
applied to the case because “the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Scarborough 
was based on Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., which was abrogated 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Townsend.”273 Thus, because 
Scarborough was no longer good law, a plaintiff who brings a claim that 
does not implicate the Jones Act should be treated no differently than any 
non-seaman.274 
Evaluating the parties’ arguments, Judge Fallon explained that “[t]his 
court is faced with the purely legal question of whether a seaman can 
recover non-pecuniary damages against a non-employer third-party 
tortfeasor under general maritime law.”275 Judge Fallon then noted initially 
that the availability of punitive damages under common law and general 
maritime law predates the Constitution.276 In spite of this long history, 
however, the Supreme Court held in Miles that a seaman could not recover 
non-pecuniary damages from his or her Jones Act employer under either a 
negligence or unseaworthiness claim.277 The Miles Court explained, “it would 
be inconsistent with this Court’s place in the constitutional scheme to sanction 
more expansive remedies for the judicially created unseaworthiness cause of 
action, in which liability is without fault, than Congress has allowed in cases 
of death resulting from negligence.”278 Judge Fallon noted that since the 
Miles decision, trial and appellate courts nearly eliminated non-pecuniary 
damages in maritime personal injury law and wrongful death cases—until 
Townsend.279 
In Townsend, the Supreme Court disturbed the trend of disallowing 
non-pecuniary damages by “explaining that its holding in Miles did not 
abolish all punitive damages under maritime law, as many courts seemed 
to be interpreting the decision.”280 Moreover, Judge Fallon noted that the 
Townsend Court “reiterated that ‘[b]ecause punitive damages have long 
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been an accepted remedy under general maritime law, and because nothing 
in the Jones Act altered this understanding, such damages for the willful 
and wanton disregard of the maintenance and cure obligations should 
remain available.’”281 The Townsend Court explained that lower courts 
read Miles far too broadly.282 Furthermore, Judge Fallon explained that 
after Townsend, it became uncertain whether Townsend limited the 
recovery of punitive damages under general maritime law to only 
maintenance and cure claims or if plaintiffs could recover for other non-
maintenance and cure claims.283 
Judge Fallon, however, then cited to McBride v. Estis Well Service, 
L.L.C., an en banc Fifth Circuit decision that held that neither a seaman 
nor his survivor could recover punitive damages for personal injury or 
wrongful death claims based on either the Jones Act or general maritime 
law.284 McBride also confirmed that the reasoning of Miles “remain[ed] 
sound” for seaman personal injury and wrongful death claims.285 The Fifth 
Circuit reasoned, similar to Miles, that it could not allow for more 
expansive damages for an action based on unseaworthiness than Congress 
allowed under the Jones Act.286 Stated a different way, the Townsend 
holding would be limited to maintenance and cure claims. 
Judge Fallon then turned to his earlier decision in Collins. In Collins, 
Judge Fallon noted that neither Miles nor the en banc McBride decisions 
addressed an action by a seaman against a non-employer third-party 
tortfeasor.287 Judge Fallon changed positions from Collins, however, 
explaining that because the plaintiff elected to bring her claim under general 
maritime law, she is bound by any limitations that exist under general 
maritime law.288 Citing to McBride, Judge Fallon further explained, “[i]t has 
become clear since the en banc opinion in McBride that in wrongful death 
cases brought under general maritime law, a survivor’s recovery from 
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employers and non-employers is limited to pecuniary losses.”289 
Moreover, Judge Fallon bolstered this assertion by arguing that 
Scarborough supported this position and “[w]hile the Scarborough 
decision at one time seemed to be undermined by Townsend, it has been 
given clarity and vitality by the en banc decision in McBride.”290 
According to Judge Fallon, based on Scarborough and McBride, “the Fifth 
Circuit has now made it clear that under both the Jones Act and general 
maritime law, a seaman’s damages against both employers and non-
employers are limited to pecuniary losses.”291 Hence, Judge Fallon granted 
the defendants’ motions for partial summary judgment and dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages.292 
A plaintiff filing in the Eastern District of Louisiana faces uncertainty 
depending on which judge presides. These conflicting decisions and 
others293 have brought the issue of liability of third-party tortfeasors to the 
forefront of maritime law and signal the need to settle the murky waters of 
punitive damages. Although Judge Zainey may stand alone in his finding, 
the Fifth Circuit may soon join him by applying the principles set forth in 
Townsend.294 
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III. THE CHANGING TIDES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER GENERAL 
MARITIME LAW 
Since Townsend, the Supreme Court has not addressed punitive 
damages in maritime law involving a Jones Act seaman. Townsend’s 
holding, however, suggests a change or clarification in the tides of seaman 
recovery. No longer should a seaman be denied the same right granted to a 
non-seaman against a non-employer third-party maritime tortfeasor simply 
because of his employment connection to a vessel. 
A. Punitive Damages Are Available Under General Maritime Law 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged and affirmed that general 
maritime law recognizes punitive damages as a remedy when not 
precluded by an applicable federal statute. In both Townsend and Baker,295 
the Supreme Court awarded punitive damages in claims predicated on 
general maritime law liability. Although the Court did not decide whether 
a Jones Act seaman can recover general maritime law punitive damages 
from a third-party non-employer, this claim does not implicate the Jones 
Act. With no preclusive federal statute, seamen should be given the full 
array of remedies. 
B. Punitive Damages Should Be Available to a Jones Act Seamen for a 
Third Party’s Misconduct 
Seamen should be able to recover punitive damages under general 
maritime law against a third-party non-employer for three reasons. First, 
the Jones Act expanded the remedies available to seamen: Congress did 
not intend to limit any existing available remedies.296 Second, a seaman’s 
claim against a third party does not pertain to a Jones Act negligence claim 
against an employer. Moreover, allowing such damages adheres to the 
analytical framework of Townsend.297 Third, the Supreme Court has 
slowly eroded the Miles uniformity principle and its preemptive effect. 
1. The Jones Act Expanded the Remedies Available to Seamen 
Congress did not intend to limit a seaman’s remedies with the passage 
of the Jones Act. By its very text, the Jones Act gives a seaman the ability 
to “elect” to bring a claim against the employer, “thereby completing the 
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trilogy of heightened legal protections (unavailable to other maritime 
workers) that seamen receive because of their exposure to the ‘perils of 
the sea.’”298 Furthermore, the Jones Act “was remedial, for the benefit[s] 
and protection of seamen who are peculiarly the wards of admiralty. Its 
purpose was to enlarge that protection, not to narrow it.”299 The Act simply 
created a statutory cause of action for negligence against the seaman’s 
employer but did not disturb any preexisting available general maritime 
law remedies.300 Therefore, nothing in the Jones Act precludes the award of 
punitive damages against a non-employer third party not even contemplated 
in the statute. Throughout the history of maritime law, courts emphasize the 
need to protect seamen as the wards of admiralty.301 Reading an invisible 
limitation into the Jones Act of these wards’ right to recover general 
maritime law remedies against non-employer tortfeasors would undermine 
the core principle of maritime law to protect its wards. 
Returning to the opening hypothetical, Gilligan should be able to 
recover the same damages as the passengers aboard the M.V. Minnow. 
Facing the same dangers as the passengers entitles him to the same 
protections afforded to the non-seafarers. Moreover, arguably in the 
maritime products liability context, a seaman should be given the ability to 
recover punitive damages from a maritime manufacturer presumably 
endangering countless other seamen. The Jones Act should not shield the 
maritime manufacturer’s liability from damages caused by its willful and 
wanton misconduct. By enacting the Jones Act, Congress intended to 
expand the protections available to seamen;302 to interpret it as limiting 
those protections would thwart Congress’s intentions.  
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2. Unrelated Claims and Parties: Distinguishing Miles and 
Effectively Overruling Scarborough 
Using the analytical framework of Townsend, a claim against a third-
party non-employer does not directly invoke the Jones Act.303 Moreover, 
a claim against a third-party non-employer predated the federal statute, 
and the Jones Act did not displace any preexisting remedies. 
In Townsend, the Court noted that a seaman’s claim for maintenance 
and cure dates back to almost the 13th century, and the Jones Act in no 
way undermines the seaman’s claim.304 Similar to a claim for maintenance 
and cure, a seaman’s right to sue a third party for a maritime tort exists as 
a separate and independent claim from a Jones Act negligence cause of 
action.305 Congress has never addressed the liability of a third-party 
tortfeasor; therefore, a claim by a seaman against a third-party non-employer 
does not “sail in [the] occupied waters” of Congressional preemption.306 
Similar to maintenance and cure, general maritime law recognized the 
tort of negligence for nearly two centuries. As early as 1859, the Supreme 
Court articulated, “[n]or is the definition of the term ‘torts’ . . . confined 
to wrongs or injuries committed by direct force. It also includes wrongs 
suffered in consequence of the negligence or malfeasance of others, where 
the remedy at common law is by an action on the case.”307 A seaman long 
ago acquired the right to sue in maritime tort for damages.308 As stated in 
The Osceola, the only limitation imposed by general maritime law on a 
seaman was the inability to sue the members of the crew or the master of the 
vessel for their negligence.309 The Jones Act removed this jurisprudential 
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bar but in no way affected remedies available under general maritime law 
against non-employers. The Act “did not eliminate pre-existing remedies 
available to seamen for the separate common-law cause of action based on 
a seaman’s right [to sue in maritime tort].”310 
Although the Supreme Court in Miles limited recovery against the 
employer in an unseaworthiness action arising under general maritime law 
because of its relationship to the Jones Act, the reasoning of Miles does not 
extend to a claim by a seaman against a third-party non-employer.311 Claims 
by seamen against third-party tortfeasors are completely separate and apart 
from their remedy under the Jones Act. A claim for unseaworthiness could 
be brought against a vessel owner who also happens to be the Jones Act 
employer.312 A claim against a true third-party non-employer, however, 
does not involve or relate to the Jones Act employer. 
Unlike the no-fault claim for unseaworthiness in Miles and a negligence 
claim under the Jones Act, a claim for punitive damages against a third-party 
tortfeasor requires a much higher showing of misconduct313—typically 
willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for the safety of others.314 The 
cause of action against the third-party non-employer could arise from 
different tortious acts with completely different levels of culpability. 
Gilligan’s Jones Act employer could be found negligent simply for failing 
to check the hydraulic fluid in the steering system whereas the manufacturer 
recklessly allowed its product to be used with no warning to its consumers. 
Therefore, it would be consistent with general maritime law to impose 
a more “expansive remed[y]”315 in which the claim requires a significantly 
higher showing of fault than Congress dictated against a separately culpable 
third party. A claim for punitive damages against a third party that does not 
implicate the Jones Act or even arise from the same misconduct should not 
be precluded simply because of its distant relation to the Jones Act. 
Moreover, the Jones Act “evinces no general hostility to recovery under 
maritime law.”316 The law should not protect the more culpable third party 
under the guise of “uniformity” in seaman recovery. 
In its pursuit of this uniformity, the Fifth Circuit in Scarborough 
incorrectly limited the recovery of a Jones Act seaman in a claim that has 
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no bearing on the Jones Act.317 Moreover, since Scarborough was decided, 
the Supreme Court in Townsend specifically rejected the reasoning of 
Guevara, upon which Scarborough relied, and has undermined the Miles 
uniformity principle that Guevara’s reasoning unnecessarily expanded.318 
The Jones Act simply created a statutory claim for negligence against the 
Jones Act employer, but it did not destroy “pre-existing remedies available 
to seaman for the separate common-law cause of action based on a 
seaman’s absolute right to maintenance and cure.”319 
Although the identity of the Jones Act employer sometimes seems 
unclear due to the business entity’s structure,320 this uncertainty should not 
defeat an award of punitive damages against a third-party non-employer. 
Maritime law adopts the Highlander principle,321 according to which “[the 
Supreme Court has] no doubt that under the Jones Act only one person, 
firm, or corporation can be sued as employer.”322 If a seaman works for a 
subsidiary or shell entity of the Jones Act employer, then that cause of action 
presents a different issue. If the third-party non-employer can be classified 
as a completely independent entity to the Jones Act employer, such punitive 
damages should be available against this separate, yet culpable, entity. This 
distinction necessarily requires a factual determination of the true identity 
of the Jones Act employer. 
3. The Court Has Slowly Eroded the Miles Uniformity Principle’s 
Effect 
Turning to the Miles uniformity principle, as Judge Fallon pointed out 
in Collins, “it should make no difference whether the Plaintiff was a seaman, 
a longshoreman or a passenger.”323 Because no applicable congressional 
statute exists regarding the liability of a third party or non-employer, there 
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is no need to treat an employer under the Jones Act and a non-employer in 
a uniform fashion. Similar to Gilligan’s situation, all plaintiffs in that cause 
of action should receive the same recovery from the manufacturer 
predicated on the same tort principles of general maritime law. 
Moreover, the Court has eroded what Miles referred to as the 
uniformity principle. The Court first eroded this principle in Exxon v. 
Baker, in which the Supreme Court quoted United States v. Texas, stating, 
“to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to 
the question addressed by the common law.”324 The Jones Act neither 
speaks “directly” about non-employers nor “directly” about barring 
punitive damages. Second, in Townsend, the Court declared that the quest 
for uniformity in maritime law does not require limiting damages to the 
“lowest common denominator” set by Congress for other separate causes 
of action.325 Limiting a seaman’s recovery in a separate cause of action 
against a third-party tortfeasor would unnecessarily bring his recovery to 
the lowest common denominator. 
Furthermore, in Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. v. Calhoun, the Court 
noted that Congress may have prescribed a comprehensive tort recovery 
regime with some claims, but as to others, Congress has not prescribed 
remedies.326 Therefore, although DOHSA prescribed the remedies available 
for a wrongful death on the high seas, no congressional statute preempted or 
determined the recovery of damages in a state wrongful death action that did 
not occur on the high seas.327 With the absence of Congressional mandate, 
the Yamaha Court could determine such recovery. Congress has not created 
a comprehensive statutory scheme regarding the liability of third-party non-
employers or the categories of recoverable damages in cases arising under 
general maritime law. With this congressional silence, these areas of 
maritime law have not been preempted, and therefore, a seaman should be 
able to recover punitive damages from a third-party non-employer. 
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No one can avoid the inevitable changing tides of maritime legal 
concepts. Current Supreme Court precedent permits a Jones Act seaman to 
recover punitive damages for an employer’s willful, wanton, and arbitrary 
withholding of general maritime law maintenance and cure benefits.328 
Although the Jones Act may preclude the recovery of punitive damages 
against the Jones Act employer for negligence and wrongful death, this 
congressional statute places no limitation on the damages recoverable in an 
ancient general maritime law tort cause of action against non-employer 
third-party tortfeasors. The third party should not be shielded from punitive 
damages under general maritime law simply because Congress may have 
protected the Jones Act employer from those types of damages. 
The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc should address the issue of third-party 
liability for general maritime law punitive damages and overrule or clarify 
Scarborough.329 A seaman should be able to recover general maritime law 
punitive damages for the tortious activity of a third-party non-employer. 
No statutory maritime law precludes the recovery of such damages for this 
wholly distinct and historically available cause of action. To disallow the 
recovery of punitive damages to a seaman would constitute a grave 
injustice and limit the protections of those who face the perils of the sea. 
The wards of admiralty should be given the same protection as a non-
seafarer, and Gilligan should recover the same damages as his fellow 
castaways. 
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